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Iranian Democratization Part I: A Historical Case Study of the
Iranian Green Movement
Abstract
The 2009 Iranian Presidential Elections represented one of the most contentious displays of
the evolving Iranian democracy since the 1979 Islamic Revolution that led to the removal of
Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi – the nation’s last shah. This tumultuous political event not
only exposed a growing rift between the political and religious ruling elite in that country;
it also led to the emergence of an opposition movement that would later be known as the
Green Revolution. Viewed through a Western political lens, this revolution represented yet
another opportunity for the demise of the ruling Iranian Islamic Regime. Recently, some
scholars have questioned whether this movement was ever intended to topple the
government in the first place, and have argued instead that it represented the beginning of
a long-term civil rights push. To better understand why the Green Movement emerged one
must first understand what the original intent of the movement was, as well as the political
factors that led to its rapid growth. In order to answer these questions, this article will
compare and contrast identified similarities and differences between the 1979 Islamic
Revolution and 2009 Green Movement in order to isolate the true intent behind this
perceived Iranian political revolt
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Introduction
Iran 2009 Presidential Elections and Reactions
On June 12, 2009, the Iranian population across the country awoke with the hope and political aspiration
that the preceding months of heated presidential campaign rhetoric between President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad and reformist candidate Mir Hussein Mousavi would finally be resolved in a fair and open
election process. Despite record voter turnout and pre-election polling giving the President a slight five
percent edge, this public expectation would soon fade as electoral results along with a myriad of identified
balloting irregularities began filtering in from the various polling sites throughout the country. 1 When the
dust settled, the official results of the election would further indicate to the population that their “political
voice” had not been heard as incumbent President Ahmadinejad was awarded an overwhelming 63.3
percent of the vote. 2 As noted by the ensuing chants of “where is my vote” in the streets following the
release of the election results, it became increasingly clear to both the local and national government
officials that the population was restless and not satisfied with the current political process. 3
The resulting fallout from this perceived electoral fraud not only exposed a growing rift between the
political and religious ruling elite; it also provided a rallying cry that strengthened the youth-based
opposition movement. Unlike past Iranian protests, this movement was not well organized. Despite
government bans on public assemblies, however, reformist leaders were still able to effectively unite
Iranians from all demographic spectrums through the initial use of several mediums to include social
media sites. As support for the movement increased, one fact was certain – young Iranians wanted change
in the form of increased political and civil liberties that were more closely aligned with the “original
intent” of the 1979 Islamic Revolution and the resulting Iranian Constitution. That intent is based upon an
Islamic government designed to ensure the basic human rights of, “political and social freedoms within
the framework of the law” while fostering the, “participation of the entire people in determining their
political, economic, social, and cultural destiny.” 4 From the ruling religious elite’s perspective, this
growing turbulent debate represented a potential threat to the theocracy-based regime and their attempts
to centralize power over the years by slowly incorporating more extreme forms of Sharia law on the
masses. To counter this discontent, Iranian leaders would eventually retaliate against opposition forces in
an attempt to save the country from this perceived threat. The political climate leading up to the election
was ripe for the development of a broad-based opposition, yet the government’s forceful reaction to the
defiant crowds enabled Green Movement leaders to quickly transition their political goals into a larger
movement.
In the months following the June 12 vote, local Green Movement organizers – as a rationale for justifying
why the people should speak up – continuously espoused these constitutional and civil liberty violations
to anyone who would listen. At the start, this elusive audience included the international media; however,
as President Ahmadinejad’s regime began implementing its oppressive strategies to counter protesters,
many of the media reporters were forced to leave the country, leaving the revolutionary movement with
no international voice. In response to these increasingly repressive measures, young Iranians began
employing the nightly tactic of screaming Allah-hu-akbar (God is Great) from their household rooftops –
a practice not seen since the days of the Islamic Revolution – as a reminder to the government that
neither Allah nor the opposition was dead. Mr. Mousavi, understanding the nature of the movement and
Charlie Szrom and Ahmad Majidyar, “Iranian Presidential Election Polling Data,” June 12, 2009,
available at: http://www.irantracker.org/analysis/iranian-presidential-election-polling-data.
2 Charlie Szrom and Ahmad Majidyar, “Iranian Presidential Election Results by Province,” June 14, 2009,
available at: http://www.irantracker.org/analysis/iranian-2009-presidential-election-resultsprovince. The calculated 63.3 percent was derived by dividing the total votes cast for Ahmandinejad by
the total number of valid votes cast.
3 Leyla Ferani, “Iran can no longer suppress its youth,” June 15, 2009, available at:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/personal-view/5543122/Iran-can-no-longer-suppress-itsyouth.html.
4 “The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Iran,” March 15, 2012, available at:
http://www.iranchamber.com/government/laws/constitution_ch01.php.
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its political grievances began using these same constitutional concepts to both vilify the current
administration’s actions while also simultaneously positioning himself as the de facto leader of the Green
Movement. In essence, the Green Movement acquired a national leader in the form of a well-established
political elitist who, despite historical personal comments to the contrary, now advocated a broadening of
individual freedoms in the country.
At this point, the Iranian government began to realize that the initial outbursts were not limited to a few
privileged or secular students who lacked political connections. Instead, opposition support was broadbased and linked to all demographic, political, and religious classes throughout the country. In response,
Ahmadinejad initiated a campaign to persuade Iranians that the mounting unrest in the streets was
directly linked to Iran’s external enemies like the United States, Britain, and Israel subsequently allowing
him to take drastic measures to counter the protests. An example of Ahmadinejad’s linkage of domestic
unrest to foreign influences was first noted sometime around June 15, 2009, when the Iranian
government officially began ordering the feared Basij-e Mostaz’afin (Mobilization of the Oppressed) –
also known as the Basij Militia – to directly confront the growing opposition in the streets and put an end
to the revolt. This action was taken, as noted by the government, to counter external terrorist threats
posed by Iran’s enemies. 5 The ensuing violence that followed the unleashing of the Basij Militia on the
general population introduced the world to the level of political repression that Iran’s government would
use in order to maintain its power base. As noted earlier, this uprising was not holistically initiated as
response to overrun the government or change the entire political system. Instead, the people of Iran
expressed their dissatisfaction toward the religious control over the existing political system by voicing
their objections of the ongoing erosion of personal freedoms as originally outlined by their own
constitutional rights. To fully understand this concept and the constitutional rights Iranians used as their
platform for debate, one must first understand how and why the Iranian government was set up as a
theocracy in the first place.
To answer how and why this movement evolved, a clear distinction must be drawn between revolutionary
movements that are designed to overthrow governments and the Green Movement that evolved in order
to highlight government-related civil liberty abuses, and subsequently, to find non-violent political
solutions to domestic political problems. To better understand the forces driving increased internal
unrest, this article examines the Green Movement’s emergence by addressing five questions: 1) What
were the factors that led to the development of the Green Movement?; 2) Was the Green Movement a
revolution, a civil rights movement, or neither?; 3) Why did the Iranian government react to the
movement in the manner it did?; 4) Was the Green Movement successful in achieving its original goals?;
and 5) What lessons can the West learn from the actions of the Green Movement and the subsequent
reactions of the government toward the movement?
Answering these questions provides a better understanding of the underlying reasons why young Iranians
took to the streets in the summer of 2009 in open defiance of their government. Furthermore, a clearer
picture surfaces of the institutional tenets and religious factors that affect the daily political lives of
Iranians, enabling the western-minded reader to better understand the democratic roots fueling various
reform movements within Iran. While this article will touch on the nuclear discussion as a method for
identifying the related effects of the dilemma on democratization in Iran, the overall Iranian nuclear
weapon debate is outside the scope of the present study. These theoretical outlines will, in turn, explain
the social dynamics of Iranian society and how these dynamics affect the daily lives of the country’s
population.

The Islamic Revolution and Beyond
Historical Foundation of the Islamic Revolution
To date, Iran is recognized as one of the oldest democratic systems in the Middle East with a
constitutional-based government that dates back well over a century. The foundation for this
“Iran to take tougher action on sedition,” PressTV. [Audio podcast], February 28, 2011, available at:
http://www.presstv.ir/detail/167543.html.
5
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governmental structure was established between 1905 to 1911, when the Iranian people participated in a
“Constitutional Revolution” that pitted the population against the autocratic power of the despotic kings. 6
Although the result of this popular revolt ended in the establishment of a parliamentary style government
known as the Majlis (Parliament), the actual power essentially transferred from one dictator to another.
Having not fully resolved this centralized power structure in 1911, the Iranian population would rise again
a half century later in order finally end the oppressive dictatorship preventing them from reclaiming the
democratic ideals laid out in the1905 revolution. This time, the revolution – known to the world as the
1979 Islamic Revolution – would fundamentally change the parliamentary form of government envisioned
by the people into a hybrid religious based theocracy where a Supreme Leader was the unchallenged ruler
of the Islamic Republic.
The Islamic Revolution generally traces its roots back to the beginning of the 1963 White Revolution when
Shah Pahlavi initiated far-reaching reforms in Iran meant to modernize the country. These reforms,
however, created a large disparity between upper and lower classes and also alienated most of the
religious elite. The Islamic Revolution, as understood by the West, began on March 22, 1963, when
Iranian government security forces (SAVAK), under the control of the Pahlavi regime, unexpectedly
attacked and killed students at the Faizeyyeh Madrasa in Qom. 7 In response, Ruhollah Khomeini
(Ayatollah Khomeini) delivered a sermon two and a half months later on June 2, 1963 (Day of Ashura) at
Faizeyyeh accusing the Shah of collusion with Israel and warning the regime of its pending collapse. Two
days later, the government arrested Khomeini and took him to Tehran in order to stand trial for treason.
Angered by his arrest, Khomeini supporters – wearing white shrouds representing their willingness to die
– immediately took to the streets in violent protest, setting fire to movie theaters, banks, and government
buildings. In the ensuing clashes with government troops, several hundred protesters died after security
forces opened fire on the growing crowds. Unfortunately, this government response led to the quick
demise of the movement as many Iranians became disillusioned with the extreme measures taken by the
government. The 1963 uprising was effectively noted as the critical incident leading to the rise of the 1979
Islamic Revolution.
In 1986, President Hojat al Islam Khamene’i commemorated the 1963 event by stating:
“The June uprising was very important to our movement. That event determined the direction of
the revolution, from a nationalistic or class struggle to a 100% religious revolution. The June
uprising was not organized and Tehran was not prepared for the riot. The only factor that
motivated people to pour into the streets was religious sympathy. The 1963 suppression of the
uprising was not a failure of the revolution, but a realization of the shortcomings: a need for an
organization and to educate the public. A movement needs organization, ideology and qualified
leaders to take advantage of each suppressed uprising and use it to develop the movement,
otherwise movements will die as soon as they start.” 8
Unfortunately, the Islamic movement would have to wait another fifteen years before a better-organized
and well-defined group emerged to confront the Shah’s regime.
That unified group surfaced again in January 1978, when an article in the Iranian paper, Ettela’at,
attacked Ruhollah Khomeini by labeling him a, “black reactionary.” The article further accused Khomeini
of actually being a foreign born Indian national who was linked to the British intelligence service and
spent a majority of his time studying poetry. 9 The reaction to this factually incorrect government-backed
article was swift as thousands of religious students flooded the streets of Qom demanding an apology, a
new constitution, and the immediate return of Khomeini. Eventually the protests turned violent leading to
multiple clashes with security forces that resulted in the deaths of several students. Seizing on the
momentum created by these protests, Khomeini – exiled in Paris, France – called for more
Axworthy, Michael, A History of Iran, Empire of the Mind (New York: Basic Books-AZ, 2008), 200-202.
Majd, Mohammad Gholi, Resistance to the Shah (Gainesvill, Florida: University Press of Florida, 2000),
10.
8 H.A. I. Ali Khamene'i, “Mardom va mas'olaan! The public's right to know,” Ettela'at, June 4, 1986.
9 Schock, Kurt, Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies (Minneapolis,
MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2004), 1-5.
6
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demonstrations throughout Iran while one of the most senior marjas, Ayatollah Shari’atmadari, publicly
condemned the killings. After the traditional Shia mourning period of forty days to honor those killed in
the last uprisings, the students again filled the streets in peaceful demonstration. These protests, like the
last demonstrations, turned violent causing security forces to once again fire into the crowd killing more
students. These violent and bloody events occurred repeatedly well into May with demonstrations
increasing both in size and violence as well as protesters beginning to call for the death of the Shah and
his family.
The kindling of the revolution was now in place, but the metaphorical spark that lit the fire did not occur
until August 19, 1978 when 370 people died in a suspicious fire at the Rex Cinema in Abadan. 10 Although
later investigations linked the fire to a radical Islamic group connected to ulema (Muslim Scholar) figures,
many young Iranians pointed their fingers directly at the government and the Shah. The resulting
demonstrations spread quickly and grew in intensity during the month of Ramadan culminating on
September 8, 1978 when large demonstrations occurred in Tehran despite a government-mandated ban
on public protests and a declaration of martial law by Shah Pahlavi. During this event, tanks and
helicopters were ordered into the city to back up barricaded areas to prevent any further spread of
violence. The resulting government-backed massacre of Molotov cocktail-throwing protesters led to
hundreds of people being killed where they stood. Iranians would refer to September 8, 1978 from that
day forth as Black Friday.
At this point in the revolution, the only course of action the general population would entertain was the
immediate removal of the Shah and his government despite his repeated concessions and promises of
atonement. The revolt helped fuel a national strike until early December when another 135 demonstrators
were killed in the streets of Qazvin after tanks drove over them. 11 From this point on, it became clear that
Shah Pahlavi had lost control of both his security forces and his State. Not surprising, Mohammad Reza
Shah Pahlavi boarded his personal plane on January 16, 1979 leaving his homeland forever. Sixteen days
later on February 1, 1979, the future Supreme Leader of Iran, Ruhollah Khomeini – Ayatollah Khomeini –
would take his first steps on Iranian soil since being exiled as he walked down the stairs of his chartered
plane at Tehran’s International Airport. The new Islamic Republic had begun.

The Dawn of a New Government
With the success of the revolution came the immediate demand for a new style of government. That
government, as intended by the citizens of the revolution, would be one that respected the rights of all
people in Iran. More importantly, this revolution was commonly seen as a “People’s Revolution” with an
outcome that was driven entirely by the open expression and will of the people. Hence, the subsequent
framework of the national institutions would be one driven not only by economic and social equality, but
also by religious parity. To inspire this process, Iranians turned their focus toward their charismatic
leader, Ruhollah Khomeini, a man commonly referred to by the masses as, “Khomeini, O Emam.” 12
Accordingly, Khomeini proclaimed that the existing Iranian government was illegal and began setting up
Revolutionary Committees called Komitechs. These committees would lead the charge in hunting down
and executing many of the remaining Pahlavi regime members, forcing the surrender of the military, and
establishing the early framework for the Islamic-based political process.
Interestingly, Khomeini’s initial approach to rebuilding the Iranian government involved the targeted
killings of his opponents and the establishment of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). These
initial moves by Khomeini, despite public comments to the contrary, were a self-centered means of
protecting his blossoming empire by establishing a powerful force to counter any potential opposition to
his religious-based political plans. The result of this political consolidation was the inevitable silencing of
the moderate voices within the evolving political scene and the introduction of the velayat-e-faqih (the
Daniel L. Byman, “The rise of Low-Tech Terrorism,” May 6, 2007, available at:
http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2007/0506terrorism_byman.aspx.
11 Michael Eisenstadt, “Iran's Islamic Revolution: Lessons for the Arab Spring of 2011,” Strategic Forum
National Defense University, 267 (April 2011): 3.
12 Axworthy, A History of Iran, Empire of the Mind, 260-261.
10
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Rule of the Jurisprudent) by Khomeini and his supporters. The velayat-e-faqih is an old Shia concept that
gives absolute authority and rule of a cleric over a Muslim nation. 13 The religious establishment, in turn,
imposes this absolute authority in the absence of the Shia Messiah. Once their political power was
consolidated, Khomeini’s forces moved forward with the development and introduction of the new
constitution that set up the Islamic theocracy seen today.
Although, Khomeini ensured his own political survival within the framework of the constitution, the
actual sections and articles of the document are somewhat remarkable and forward thinking given the
time and place of its development. Interestingly, the initial draft of the constitution was crafted from the
framework of the 1906 Constitution, which included the formal introduction of clerical rule. This draft,
however, would be scrapped after demands from the moderate left requested that a formal constitutional
committee be formed consisting of Islamic scholars from throughout Iran. The final version that would be
presented to the public for acceptance dramatically changed the design of government institutions by
introducing a Supreme Leader (Khomeini) into the picture, as well as a Council of Guardians designed to
select, oversee, and possibly remove the Supreme Leader if needed. As feasible as this “separation of
powers” appeared on the outside, the basic framework of the governing body was religious in nature
allowing for the formal introduction of theocratic rule.
The new Iranian Constitution – similar in some aspects to the American Constitution – introduced
specific sections and articles within the document that guaranteed social, economic, and religious rights
to the people, as well as the rights of presumed innocence and freedom of the press. For instance, Table
1.1 below lists the specific articles in Section 3 (The Rights of the People) of the Iranian Constitution
granting individual freedoms and rights:
Table 1: Iranian Constitution with Selected Articles (Representing individual freedoms and
rights).
IRANIAN CONSTITUTION -- SECTION 3 (RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE)
ARTICLE # ARTICLE CRITERIA

14

19

All people of Iran, whatever the ethnic group or tribe to which they belong, enjoy
equal rights; and color, race, language, and the like, do not bestow any privilege.

20

All citizens of the country, both men and women, equally enjoy the protection of
the law and enjoy all human, political, economic, social, and cultural rights, in
conformity with Islamic criteria.

22

The dignity, life, property, rights, residence, and occupation of the individual are
inviolate, except in cases sanctioned by law.

24

26

27

Publications and the press have freedom of expression except when it is
detrimental to the fundamental principles of Islam or the rights of the public. The
details of this exception will be specified by law.
The formation of parties, societies, political or professional associations, as well as
religious societies, whether Islamic or pertaining to one of the recognized
religious minorities, is permitted provided they do not violate the principles of
independence, freedom, national unity, the criteria of Islam, or the basis of the
Islamic republic. No one may be prevented from participating in the
aforementioned groups, or be compelled to participate in them.
Public gatherings and marches may be freely held, provided arms are not carried
and that they are not detrimental to the fundamental principles of Islam.

Mehdi Khalaji, “The Iranian's Clergy’s Silence,” Hudson Institute: Current Trends in Islamic Ideology
vol 10 (2010), available at: http://www.currenttrends.org/research/detail/the-iranian-clergys-silence.
14 “Islamic Republic of Iran Constitution,” 1996, available at: http://www.iranonline.com/iran/iraninfo/government/constitution.html.
13
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33
34

No one can be banished from his place of residence, prevented from residing in
the place of his choice, or compelled to reside in a given locality, except in cases
provided by law.
It is the indisputable right of every citizen to seek justice by recourse to competent
courts. All citizens have right of access to such courts, and no one can be barred
from courts to which he has a legal right of recourse.

37

Innocence is to be presumed, and no one is to be held guilty of a charge unless his
or her guilt has been established by a competent court.

39

All affronts to the dignity and repute of persons arrested, detained, imprisoned, or
banished in accordance with the law, whatever form they may take, are forbidden
and liable to punishment.

As noted in the selected articles, several individual freedoms warranted direct identification. Some of
these rights included the freedom of expression, the presumption of innocence, the right of public
assembly, and the rights to equality and privacy. Furthermore, articles 34, 37, and 39 articulate clear
guidelines for ensuring individual rights to a fair and speedy trial including the initial detention process.
In all, Section 3 is a shining example of a concerted attempt to develop a governmental framework that
would not only protect its citizens from potential abuse, but also enable the growth of a free society under
Islam. The Iranian Constitution was subsequently ratified through a national referendum on December 3,
1979 with a government-reported 98 percent of the vote. 15 The new constitution, in turn, institutionalized
clerical domination of the State and incorporated Islamic religious interpretation as the guiding authority
of the government. Unfortunately, the intention of this constitutional change in comparison to the
document’s practical implementation in a theocracy has led to a slow disintegration of personal freedoms
since its ratification.

The Iranian Penal Code and its Effects on Society
One cause for the implementation difficulty is the July 30, 1991 ratification by the High Expediency
Council of a national penal code introducing many vaguely worded laws designed to tighten control of the
population by government officials. Further restriction of individual rights occurred again on May 22,
1996 when the same council ratified The Book of Five of the Penal Code also known as the Ta’azirat. The
introduction of the Ta’azirat into Iranian society effectively imposed a stricter form of Islamic (Shari’a)
Law upon the daily lives of the general population. For instance, instituted codes like, “Offenses Against
the National and International Security of the Country” were used by the government to circumvent the
constitutional right of public assembly and freedom of expression by suppressing peaceful activity or any
expression that was perceived as critical of public officials or their policies. 16 As will be outlined later,
these new laws restricting constitutional rights of individuals would play a major role in the development
of the Green Movement and its stated goals.

Iranian Leadership and the Evolution of Political Discourse
New Leadership, Old Habits
Since the implementation of both the Iranian Constitution and the later penal codes, many public figures
have tried to build a political consensus to counter these imposed restrictions and recapture the rights of
the people. One of the most prominent individuals associated with this internal political struggle was the
fifth President of Iran, Sayyid Mohammad Khatami, who championed the reformist and liberalization
movement during his time in office from 1997 to 2005. For instance, shortly after being elected with more
15 “Iran After the Victory of 1979's Revolution,” 2006, available at:
http://www.iranchamber.com/history/islamic_revolution/revolution_and_iran_after1979_1.php.
16 “Iran: Submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review,” Human Rights Watch UPR Submission on
Iran, September 1, 2009, doi: MDE 13/009/2009, available at:
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/MDE13/009/2009.
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than 70 percent of the popular vote including a large majority in Qom, President Khatami – without
attacking the velayat-e-faqih – called for proper constitutional government and a halt to extra-judicial
violence. Khatami would go on to state in his inaugural speech that he expected the, “honorable Judiciary
to assist the Executive branch in the management of a safe, secure and just society based on the rule of
law.” 17 Furthermore, Khatami often stated that his reform program was the last chance for the Islamic
republic, and if the reforms were blocked the people would demand a secular government and overturn
the theocratic regime.
In 1998, Khatami introduced the Dialogue Among Civilizations initiative in direct response to the 1996
Samuel P. Huntington theoretical book, The Clash of Civilizations. 18 His intent was to draw the
international community into a common debate to break down the barriers amongst the nations and build
trust between different cultures. This initiative eventually lead to the United Nations proclaiming 2001 as
the Year of Dialogue Among Civilizations. 19 Unfortunately, the religious establishment in Iran did not
welcome Khatami’s vision as it represented a direct threat to the power and control of clerical rule.
Khatami’s election was symbolic because he was elected with over 70 percent of the vote with turnout over
80 percent. 20 This large winning percentage, more importantly, also represented a political dichotomy.
On one hand, Khatami was surprisingly elected by a broad-based ideological voting spectrum that
represented individuals from both the left and the hard-line conservative right. On the other hand, this
broad-based political voting core elected Khatami on the assumption he would lead the charge to reform
the very political system that many hardline conservatives found sacred. Interestingly, Khatami’s election
occurred on May 23 – a date referred to as the 2nd of Khordad on the Iranian calendar – a date regarded
as the anniversary date of the start of reforms in Iran in 1376. Consequently, many Iranian scholars today
identify Khatami’s followers as the “2nd of Khordad Movement” while also depicting his election day as
the official beginning of the reform movement in modern day Iran. 21

Causes for Political Rifts – Khatami Years
Many of the reforms experienced during Khatami’s two terms evolved not only out of a personal desire to
improve the political system in Iran, but also from a necessity to resolve many economic and foreign
policy issues plaguing the country. One of these critical yet cumbersome issues was the foreign policy
stance of Iran toward the West. For instance, the neoconservative elite desired a hardline foreign policy
approach and refused any type of dialogue with the West to include discussions concerning Israel. While
on a state visit to Pope John Paul II’s funeral, however, Khatami made the first open gesture toward Israel
since the 1979 revolution when he openly greeted Israeli President Moshe Katsav (although he later
denied this event occurred) and shook his hand. 22 This act of perceived “recognition” of Israel along with
Khatami’s attempts in 2003 to open dialogue with the United States became pivotal moments in the
reform movement’s history as the conservative right began its silent push to counter Khatami’s efforts and
destroy the reformists movements once and for all.
The first indication that the conservative right was on the move surfaced in the February 2004 elections
when the Guardian Council banned hundreds of moderate candidates aligned with the reformist-backed
Khatami, Said Mohammad, Hope and Challenge. The Iranian President Speaks (Binghamton, NY:
Institute of Global and Cultural Studies, 1997), 78-79.
18 Abrahamian, Ervand, A History of Modern Iran (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 18587.
19 Ahmed, Akbar and Brian Forst, After terror: promoting dialogue among civilizations (Cambridge,
England: Polity Press, 2005), 73-75.
20 Abrahamian, A History of Modern Iran, 186.
21 Ehteshami, Anoushiravan and Mahjoob Zweiri, Iran and the Rise of its Neoconservatives, The Politics
of Tehran's Silent Revolution (New York, NY: I B Tauris & Co Ltd., 2007), 5-6.
22 “Iran's Khatami "Strongly denies" meeting Israeli president,” Iran Focus News & Analysis, April 9,
2005, available at:
http://www.iranfocus.com/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1830:irans-khatamiqstrongly-deniesq-meeting-israeli-president&catid=4:iran-general&Itemid=26.
17
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Islamic Iran Participation Front Party. 23 In response, many of the serving parliamentary reformist
members submitted their resignations to President Khatami stating they would boycott the elections if
held on time. Khatami would ultimately refuse their resignations and would hold the elections on time;
however, the political damage was done. In the end, this political move by the council led to the
Abadgarane Iran-e-Islami (Developers of Islamic Iran) Party with conservative candidates winning
nearly 70 percent of the parliamentary seats effectively shifting the balance of power in parliament away
from the reformist agenda. 24 The political dice had been cast and the stage was now set for the pending
development of the Green Movement.

Rise of Neoconservatism
Khatami’s election was somewhat of an unexpected and unpleasant surprise to the conservative
establishment and required time for religious leaders to adjust to his moderate views. He not only
managed to capture an enormous majority of the popular vote, but he was also able to energize the young
Iranian generation in a manner the religious right had not seen since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. All of
this momentum, however, would abruptly stop after Khatami attempted to establish nominal relations
with the United States in an attempt to heal old wounds with the West. Seizing on political opportunities
and a desire to keep the status-quo, hard-liners within the government along with help from Ministry of
Intelligence and Security (MOIS) officials would spend years trying to discredit Khatami and his reform
ideas.
In 1998, Dariush Foruhar and his wife Parvaneh, both veterans of the revolution, were murdered in their
apartment by suspected MOIS agents in an attempt to portray Khatami as a traitor to the Islamic State by
blaming him for the attack. 25 On another occasion, MOIS agents arrested thirteen Jews in Shiraz on
fabricated charges of espionage in an open political attack against Khatami and his attempts to reconnect
with the Israeli state. Interestingly, Khomeini had made a public decree after the 1979 Islamic Revolution
that all Jews would be protected in accordance with Islamic customs to “protect the People of the Book.”
Whether these events could be linked to the President or not was moot. The political damage to the
Iranian leader and his reform platform was done. The conservatives – to include religious leaders at the
highest levels of the government –positioned themselves for the next political election.

Election of Ahmadinejad
By the spring of 2005, the Iranian Presidential Election campaign was in full swing. Two candidates were
in the final months of the campaigning process that would decide which political path Iran would go down
next. On one side of the political field was ex-President Hashemi Rafsanjani, who many Iranians felt
represented the worst aspects of political cronyism and the corrupt nature of the religious regime. On the
other side was a political unknown by the name of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad who many would vote for
simply because he was not a mullah. The ninth president of Iran would eventually be determined after a
second run-off vote on June 24, 2005. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad won in the run-off with roughly 63.4
percent of the popular vote subsequently defeating Rafsanjani. 26 Ahmadinejad’s election not only
represented a clear shift in the political arena, it also highlighted a deeply polarized population. More
specifically, his presidential win exposed a growing rift between Iranians who supported the reformist
platform of Rafsanjani and those who favored the Ahmadinejad led neoconservative demands for
redistribution of wealth and the protection of the Islamic nature of the state. In essence, Ahmadinejad’s
election was a significant victory for the large number of Iranians who still strongly opposed the reformist
movement.
“Iran reformists' protest continues,” CNN World, January 12, 2004, available at:
http://articles.cnn.com/2004-01-12/world/iran.walkout_1_guardian-council-mohsen-mirdamadimohammad-reza-khatami?_s=PM:WORLD.
24 Mahan Abedin, “Iran after the Elections,” Middle East Intelligence Bulletin 6:(2/3), March 2004,
available at: http://www.meforum.org/meib/articles/0402_iran1.htm.
25 Axworthy, A History of Iran, Empire of the Mind, 278.
26 Alex Kireev, “Iran Presidential Election 2005,” Electoral Geography 2, June 1, 2007, available at:
http://www.electoralgeography.com/new/en/countries/i/iran/2005-president-elections-iran.html.
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Like past election winners, Ahmadinejad promised to champion the effort to eradicate poverty in the
country and to break the cycle of corruption within the government. Despite these generic populist
comments, however, his political agenda is far more radical than is publicly stated. For instance,
Ahmadinejad is one of the core members of the original revolution in 1979 that brought down the Shah of
Iran and helped form the new urban-based social classes in the country. His political allies – the migrant
class from the rural to urban areas – are, in turn, found throughout the government, as well as the IRGC
and are subsequently willing to defend his presidency if needed. Ahmadinejad also portrayed himself as a
politician of the people and a leader who will stand up for the individual who other political regimes have
left behind. This aspect of his presidency is evident in his many speeches where he advocates social justice
issues like wealth transfers to the poor. Regardless of intent, however, his political agenda has proven to
be lack luster, ineffective, and prone to instigating political infighting between his party’s rank and file
and the religious ruling elite.
The inherent issue surrounding the rise of the neoconservative movement is that it has not only clashed
periodically with the religious conservative class, but the movement’s leaders have taken an increasingly
harder line against any type of constitutional reforms in the country. The Iranian neoconservatives, in
effect, had rediscovered the lower and middle class issues and had effectively separated themselves from
the country’s traditional conservatives who were seen as not protecting the people. Furthermore,
Ahmadinejad was able to use his anti-corruption platform to his advantage in consolidating support
against the perceived corrupt elements of the ruling class. Internationally, President Ahmadinejad
successfully led the charge in tightening the foreign policy agenda by hardening Tehran’s political line
against the West. For instance, in direct contrast to the Khatami era call for reform and reconciliation
with international entities, Ahmadinejad took a step back by calling for Israel to be, “wiped off the map”
and by also raising doubts about the Jewish Holocaust. 27
On the domestic front, Iran experienced a growing trend of discontent toward economic issues directly
related to the regime’s policies. For example, Table 3.1 below depicts sharp contrasts to campaign
promises to curb economic woes as Iran’s unemployment rate is shown averaging 13.5 percent since 2005.

Nazilla Fathl, “Wipe Israel 'off the map' Iranian says,” New York Times, October 25, 2005, available at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/26/world/africa/26iht-iran.html.
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Table 2: Iran Annual Unemployment Rate 28

Country 1999 2002 2003 2004 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Iran

14 15.7 16.3 11.2

15 12.5 11.8 14.6 15.3

This 13.5 percent includes a 23.01 percent unemployment rate for ages 15-24, which ranks Iran the 37th
highest in the world for unemployed youths. 29 Following this trend, the unemployment rate hit 15.3
percent in 2011. 30 Furthermore, Iran’s reported inflation rate reached 22.5 percent in 2011 ranking the
country as the 4th highest in the world. 31 Hence, these combined economic issues led to the general
population once again questioning whether the religious backed conservative agenda was right for the
country and also reignited the constitutional reform debate in light of the perceived abuses experienced
under the current regime. In 2009, the country along with the international community would witness the
effects of this growing social debate as the reemergence of the reformist movement once again gathered
wind in its sails in order to publicly take on both the Ahmadinejad machine and the religious
establishment.

The “Green Revolution”
Rise of the Movement (The People Speak Out)
On June 12, 2009, results from the bitterly contested presidential elections were officially released to the
public announcing that incumbent, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, had soundly defeated selfanointed reformist candidate, Mir Hussein Mousavi, with over 63 percent of the popular vote. 32
Immediately following the release of the vote count, reformist protestors began filling the Tehran streets
chanting, “where is my vote” in disbelief that their candidate, who was within five points of Ahmadinejad
24-hours earlier, had been beaten so badly. As noted earlier, the government realized quickly that the
burst of fury from the population was wide spread and involved all privileged and secular classes to
include the university student populace. Accordingly, the ruling establishment took steps to mitigate the
growing anger over the perceived trampling of the electoral system by the government. These measures
included the regime indiscriminately arresting protesters and intentionally switching broadcasted images
to black and white in order to conceal the use of green as a rallying for demonstrators. Despite these
attempts to calm the public, the demonstrations continued.

“Unemployment Rate Percentage,” Index Mundi, 2011, available at:
http://www.indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?c=ir&v=74.
29 “The CIA World Factbook,” Central Intelligence Agency, January 01, 2011, available at:
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2129rank.html.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 Szrom and Majidyar, “Iranian Presidential Election Polling Data,” June 12, 2009.
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Wearing green, the official color of the Mousavi campaign, the protestors filled Azadi ‘Freedom’ Square
and voiced their opposition to the regime and to the election process. Initially, Iranians participated in
these protests out of mere anger toward what they viewed as a corrupt system. This anger was fueled by
the fact that most Iranians felt they had the constitutional right to speak out and peacefully protest in
public regardless of what the Supreme Leader stated or the political ruling elite wanted. Furthermore,
despite the international media’s label of the opposition as the next insurrection or Islamic Revolution,
the fact remained that most Iranians were simply disgusted with the political process but did not desire to
topple the government. As noted earlier, this anger did not suddenly appear on the streets after a suspect
election. Instead, Iranians – since the onset of the 1979 Islamic Revolution – have watched the
government they helped usher in systematically counter, destroy, and circumvent their constitutional
rights in the name of protecting the Islamic establishment. In fact, the government would demonstrate
this approach when they utilized their propaganda machine to counter the opposition by labeling the color
green as a counter-revolutionary symbol and not the historical symbol of Islamic freedom.
An important detail often missed in this wave of revolutionary fervor is that Iran’s political establishment
suffered significant fissures from this election fallout because many in the opposition movement were
connected directly to the establishment and its past policies. Furthermore, the electoral process also
exposed a growing rift between the President and the Supreme Leader, as well as between
neoconservatives and moderate reformists in the government ranks. The fact remains, that the
constitutionally elected leadership was becoming more outspoken against the virtually unchecked Islamic
religious authority in the country. The population further fueled this open debate as tighter Islamic rules,
like harsher dress codes, new detention laws, and rules against public protests were forced on the people
by the religious establishment as a mechanism to control dissent against the government. The best
example of this constriction on personal liberties is the phased implementation of Iranian penal codes
over the last twenty years to include the Book of Five Penal Code ratified in May of 1996. Furthermore, the
presence of senior clerics on the side of the opposition made it difficult for Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali
Khameini and Ahmadinejad to completely ignore the demands of the opposition. From that aspect, the
opposition demanded democratic change – Islamic democratic change – that guaranteed nothing less
than power vested in the people and full accountability of the government of the people. In essence, this
maturing reform movement represented a form of Islamic democratization and a return to the basic
human freedoms and values incorporated into the original 1906 Iranian Constitution.

The Push for Islamic Democratization
The idea of pushing democratic reforms in an Islamic-based government is not a new concept, nor is it a
concept strictly imported wholesale from the West. In fact, every Iranian leader in the last thirty years
including Ahmadinejad has championed some form of democratic change. The debate, however, centers
around what type of democratization will occur and who will be the power base behind those reforms.
Furthermore, the entry of the Green Movement onto the political stage ensured that whatever type of
democratic reform occurred would happen sooner rather than later. For this reason, one could consider
the Green Movement an establishment movement supported by the people rather than a revolution
designed to topple the government.
Once it became clear that this stage of the reformist movement was not going to fade away, established
political and religious leaders, like Mousavi, Khatami, Mehdi Karroubi, and to a further extent exPresident Rafsanjani began throwing their support behind the cause. In fact, Rafsanjani would remark to
students in Mashhad that, “If the people of Iran want, we [can] stay and govern; if not we [should] go.” 33
The fact that he made these remarks is significant in that the use of the word “go” was a direct statement
aimed at Supreme Leader Khameini. Ayatollah Khomeini had used the same phrase in his 1979 speeches
directed at the Shah of Iran with the intent of telling the Monarch that his time was up. Interestingly,
Rafsanjani’s son, Mehdi, had previously stated during the 2005 Presidential Elections, that if his father
was elected he would, “change Iran’s Constitution to reduce the power of Iran’s Supreme Religious Leader
33 Muhammad Sahimi, “The Middle Road of Hashemi Rafsanjani,” Frontline, April 28, 2010, available at:
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2010/04/the-middle-road-of-hashemirafsanjani.html.

29

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2013

Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 6, No. 1

and make the position a ceremonial role akin to the King (Queen) of England.” 34 Understanding the
“Rafsanjani Effect” on the reformist movement, in turn, is critical to analyzing the future path of the
Green Movement and deserves some discussion at this point.

The Rafsanjani Effect
Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani is considered one of the top influential Iranian politicians, as well as,
one of the religious establishment’s highest-ranking figures. Rafsanjani is also a prolific writer, thinker,
and religious expert who was elected the fourth President of Iran (1989-1997). Finally, he was a member
of the Assembly of Experts until his “forced” resignation in 2011. As noted above, Rafsanjani decided to
run for President again in 2005 in an attempt to further the reform process that President Khatami had
started years earlier and to counter the growing influence of the neoconservatives in the country. His
political views are somewhat moderate in the sense that he supports a free market system domestically
and advocates the privatization of state-owned industries. During his time as President, he was a leading
proponent for tempering the diplomatic response to the West and supported a low-key approach to
communication with the United States in an effort to avoid unnecessary conflict. After his 2005 electoral
defeat, he became an ardent critic of Ahmadinejad and his neoconservative policies and began to publicly
decry the failures and incompetence of the regime. Before the June 12, 2009 elections, Rafsanjani
delivered a letter to Ayatollah Khameini that would not only anger the hardliners in the establishment,
but would mark him as the leading reformist advocate in Iran and a “threat” to the theocratic rule. The
following is the letter written to Khameini:
“Unfortunately, the untrue and irresponsible statements of Ahmadinejad during his debate with Mousavi,
his pre-debate statements and the events afterwards remind us of what the hypocrites and
counterrevolutionary groups said and did in the first few years after the Revolution, as well as the
accusations during the 2005 elections, the elections for the 6th Majles, and the nonsense that [Abbas]
Palizdar propagated [an ally of Ahmadinejad who made sweeping charges of corruption against the
clerics in 2008], who has been convicted in the court of law. Since some of the allegations had already
been printed in the government-controlled media and had been repeated in the speech [by Ahmadinejad]
in the holy Mashhad, the claim that he might have been influenced by the debate's atmosphere and the
attacks were unplanned is not acceptable. This is apparently an attempt to distract people's attention from
the many documented reports by the Government Accounting Office about the $1 billion that is missing,
and committing thousands of other unlawful acts in using the national budget. Or it could be that he
[Ahmadinejad] feels that his main competitor [Mousavi] is a hero of a quarter of century of the Islamic
Revolution.
Tens of millions of people in the country and outside witnessed his lying and breaking the laws of religion,
justice, morality, and fairness, and the attacks on the achievements of our Islamic system. But, the society,
especially the youth, wants to know the truth, the truth that is directly linked with the legitimacy and
prestige of our system and nation [emphasis added]; if this had been about only a few people, I would not
have written this letter.
History is witness to the fact that the majority of our revolutionary people are not influenced by such
lies, and the evidence for it is the votes that I was honored to receive in the latest elections for the
Assembly of Experts [in 2006], and you also know very well that, due to my responsibilities, I have not
made any statement against any candidate in the present elections and, when necessary, I have
emphasized the necessity of maximum participation by the people in voting and the fairness of the
election, and I also stated officially that I did not intend to run...

It should be noted that it is possible that the government agents are aware of my view that the
continuation of the present state of affairs [a government run by Ahmadinejad] is not in the
interest of the political system and the country, and you yourself know this view of mine very well as I
have told you my reasons for it, but I have never talked to the media about it...

34

Ibid.
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Despite this, even if I patiently continue my policy [of not pursuing the matter], part of the
population and political parties and groups will undoubtedly not accept this situation, and the volcanoes
that are fed by people's anger will form in the society, many examples of which can be seen in the
election demonstrations in streets and universities.
Therefore, it is essential in the remaining time that Your Excellency's and people's desire for having
free elections with maximum participation by the people be materialized to rescue the country from
danger, and create national unity and public trust, so that those who seek to create strife in the nation
cannot misinterpret and abuse what you said in Mashhad and at the mausoleum of the late Imam
[Ayatollah Khomeini], and add gasoline on the fire by breaking the law [emphasis added].” 35
In an attempt to avert a crisis as indicated in the underlined wording in the letter above – which the ruling
establishment rejected – Rafsanjani would go on to outline the following proposals for saving the country
and the establishment from pending doom:
1.

The government should act in a way to restore the people's shattered trust in it.

2. Every person and every institution, whether it is the political establishment, or the
government, the Majles, the security forces, or the protestors, should act lawfully. Those not
happy with the present laws must try peacefully to modify them.
3. An environment must be created in which all sides can express their opinions peacefully and
without fighting or fear (tacit support for peaceful demonstrations). The means of mass
communication, especially the Voice and Visage, should promote this goal.
4. All political prisoners must be released immediately. "We should not allow our enemies to
laugh at us and plot against us, because we have imprisoned some people. We need to
tolerate each other," he said.
5.

Those who have been hurt by recent events must be compensated. "We need to express our
heartfelt and sincere sorrow for what has happened to them.

6. Independent means of mass communication must be allowed to operate legally and within the
framework of law. The political establishment must not ignore the lawful rights of a free press. 36
Despite these efforts by Rafsanjani, the toxic political environment surrounding the election process
before and after the release of the results caused him to be sidelined by the establishment and eventually
put under house arrest. Unfortunately for the government, this high level of support would help galvanize
the opposition laying the framework for future protests against the government. The Khameini
government, on the other hand, would not view this reform push in the same light that the opposition
leaders did as the movement presented a viable threat to both the religious power base, as well as to its
ability to be the trusted as the ethical and moral gatekeeper of the theocratic government. Khameini
would subsequently decide to impose his religious authority and publicly demand an end to the protests
stating that the election results were final and the process was fair. 37

Ibid.
Ibid.
37 pittsburgh06hy (Videographer), “Khameini Speech in Masshad - Farsi with English Description,” 2009,
available at:
http://wn.com/iran's_election_ayatollah_Khameini_orders_probe,_protests_spark_for_mahmoud_a
hmadinejad_and_mir_hossein_mousavi_abc_news?orderby=relevance&upload_time=today. This
YouTube video was interpreted by my local translator who worked directly for me in Afghanistan from
2011-2012.
35
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This singular act by the Supreme Leader – one noted in Rafsanjani’s letter – clearly depicts the one aspect
of Iranian political life that, unfortunately, blocks the full-fledged effort of the reforming Iranian society at
this point in time. That aspect is a concept discussed earlier, known as velayat-e-faqih or the rule of the
jurisprudent. Ayatollah Khomeini effectively institutionalized velayat-e-faqih in 1979 as a means to
consolidate power at the religious level and effectively establish a theocratic regime. This same concept is
also the protecting element of the regime today in the form of the IRGC. Hence, despite the fact that a
large portion of Iranian society desires, and in some instances demands reforms, the velayat-e-faqih acts
as the virtual block against any real progress against the political and religious elite. This was seen in the
government response to the Green Movement after it became clear that the building frustration in the
population was not going to dissipate.

The Government Response
The Green Movement initially began as a peaceful public outcry over the alleged election irregularities,
but would eventually lead to broader verbal attacks directly against the Regime, as well as to the Supreme
Leader himself. Between June 13-19, 2009, security forces would gradually ratchet up their response to
the crowds as the protests grew in both size and audacity. Although the initial response by government
security forces managed to quell many of the crowds and disperse the protesters, the movement became
more difficult to control as the intensity built within the unorganized masses. 38 For instance, on June 15 –
three days after the vote – over 200,000 Mousavi supporters crowded into Azadi (Freedom) Square in a
peaceful show of unity against the alleged election fraud. Security forces, with little regard for
constitutional rights, attacked the crowds with the support of plainclothes Basij Militia members riding
motorcycles. 39 These violent attacks on the demonstrators continued for several weeks resulting in at least
forty reported deaths during the month of June, with twenty-seven officially reported in the first seven
days of the demonstrations. 40 Of these, the death of Neda Agha-Soltan would be the most highly
publicized internationally – discussed later – and would come to represent the movement’s cause both
personally and visually.
The ultimate goal of the protesters in the early days was to force Khameini to invalidate the official
elections and mandate another run off. The protesters’ hopes, however, were dashed on June 19, 2009,
when Ayatollah Khameini challenged the election fraud allegations during Friday prayers and
subsequently threatened to initiate a crackdown if they did not stop. Movement protesters remained
defiant and faced the ensuing crackdown the following day despite an additional ten people dying in the
violence. In response to the growing crowds, senior cleric Ahmad Khatami (not to be confused with exPresident Khatami), would publicly support the Supreme Leader on June 26, 2012 during Friday prayers
when he called on the Judiciary to “punish demonstrators severely and without mercy.” 41 Khatami went
on to state that the agitation was creating insecurity and terror and was considered to be moharebeh or an
enmity against Allah (God). 42 Over the next two months, authorities arrested over 4,000 people – many
whom would be released later – and more aggressively dispersed any discovered congregation of people.
In some reported instances, the government offered compensation to shopkeepers for damaged property

“Green Movement Spreading Despite Crackdown,” Institute For War & Peace Reporting (16),
November 13, 2009, available at: http://iwpr.net/report-news/green-movement-spreading-despitecrackdown.
39 “The Islamic Republic at 31: Post-Election Abuses Show Serious Human Rights Crisis,” Human Rights
Watch, February 11,2010, ISBN: 1-56432-601-2, available at:
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iran0210web.pdf.
40 Kenneth Katzman, “Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses,” Congressional Research Service,
Middle Eastern Affairs, March 4, 2011, 13, available at:
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/158487.pdf.
41 “Iran: Detained Political Leaders at Risk of Torture, Possibly to Force ‘Confessions’," Human Rights
Watch, June 29, 2009, available at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/news/detainedpolitical-leaders-at-risk-of-torture-20090629.
42 Ibid.
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for those who would lodge official complaints against specific individuals. 43 Despite these repressive
tactics, protesters crowded streets on September 18, 2009 (Qods Day) shouting anti-government slogans
in open defiance of the establishment. 44 This demonstration process would continue for several months to
include the following events:’
November 2, 2009
December 7, 2009
December 18, 2009
December 27, 2009

Anniversary of the US Embassy takeover
National Student’s Day
Grand Ayatollah Ali Montazeri’s Death (Dissident Cleric and Father of the
Green Movement)
Ashura (Government forces opened fire on peaceful demonstrations)

As noted in the fall of 2009, the government’s reaction to the Green Movement became increasingly
tougher. During this period, over one hundred show trials were conducted by the government reminiscent
of Stalin’s 1930 trials in the Soviet Union. 45 Of the leaders, activists, and theorists charged, the following
were the most significant:
Saeed Haijarian
Mohammad Abtahi
Moshen Miradamadi
Behzad Nabavi

The Movement’s architect and senior advisor to ex-President Khatami
Khatami’s former vice president
Former member of parliament and one of the mastermind’s to the US
Embassy takeover
Former deputy speaker of the parliament and co-founder of the reform party

All accused individuals to include the four listed above were forced to confess on state television to crimes
and fabricated charges against the nation. Furthermore, these confessions represented the individuals
who survived the interrogation and torture in the Kahrizak prison. Interestingly, many of these
confessions included statements meant to indicate to the general public that the United States, Britain,
and Israel were behind the Green Movement’s goals to weaken the Islamic regime. Hence, the
government’s propaganda machine was in high gear trying to assess and “connect the dots” for the public
that America (the Great Satan) and its allies were the root cause of all the problems in the country.
Although there may be some truth behind western involvement – through economic sanctions – in poor
economic conditions in the country, as well as the use of subversive tactics to stir up internal strife, the
fact remains that Iran’s core issues center on the political struggle between the absolute power of its
theocracy and the constitutional freedoms that respect human dignity. In essence, the real “clash of
civilizations” in Iranian life is found between Islamic rule and the concept of Natural Law pertaining to
basic human rights within the existing political system.
The Iranian government eventually started targeting newspapers, magazines, and websites loyal to the
movement by shutting them down and imprisoning their journalists. In fact, the IRGC decided to take a
majority stake in Iran’s telecommunication industry as a means to achieve government control of the
Internet within the country. 46 Finally, Supreme Leader Khameini gave the order to institute “house
arrests” on the primary leaders of the Movement. This included Mousavi and Khatami who the
establishment deemed to be a threat to the security of the State and the Regime. Khatami would
eventually be forced out of his position in the Assembly of Experts in 2011, as the Supreme Leader further
exerted is authority under the velayat-e-faqih in order to “protect the Islamic establishment.” The
movement, however, was and still is bigger than two, three, or four individuals. The movement is about an
idea first instilled in the Iranian mindset in 1906 with the introduction of the first constitution of the
people. The untimely death of Neda Agha-Soltan demonstrated this concept to the world in both images
and meaning and therefore deserves some discussion in order to fully understand why the Iranian youth
chose this particular time to act.
“Iran: Election Contested, Repression Compounded,” Human Rights Watch, December 10, 2009, 1920, available at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/MDE13/123/2009.
44 Ibid.
45 Laura Secor, “The Iran Show,” The New Yorker, August 31, 2009, available at:
http://www.newyorker.com/talk/comment/2009/08/31/090831taco_talk_secor.
46 Maryam Ny, “From Theocracy to Militarization- An Interview with Reza Aslan,” Persian to English,
May 12, 2010, available at: http://persian2english.com/?p=10508.
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The Neda Agha-Soltan Incident
The story of Neda Agha-Soltan is summed up best by her fiancé Caspian Makan, in a personal posting
online after her death that read, “She never supported any particular presidential candidate. She wanted
freedom, freedom for everybody.” 47 The events surrounding Neda’s death are as dramatic as the
international scenes depicting her demise on the hot streets of Tehran during the 2009 demonstrations.
Neda was a twenty-six year old Iranian woman who according to her mother loved philosophy and
theology, and was considered a spiritual person. Furthermore, Neda was known in her community as a
gifted singer and musician. In fact, it was her music instructor, Hamid Panahi, who was with her in
Tehran that moment she was shot by a lone gunman. As noted by Neda’s fiancé, the only reason they
exited the vehicle they were driving, was that they were stuck in the crowds with no air conditioner in the
car and decided to get out in order to cool off. What happened afterwards has become the personal symbol
of a broader popular movement.
According to reports, Neda and her music instructor intended to join the Green Movement rallies in
Tehran on June 20, 2009, but decided to head home after being caught up in a clash with Basij Militia in
central Tehran. After stopping on the road, the two exited the vehicle in order to get some fresh air. While
standing in front of the vehicle talking, a single shot rang out from a lone gunman hitting Neda in the
chest. Neda immediately fell to the ground and began bleeding while a nearby doctor, Dr. Arash Hejazi,
tried in vain to save her life. 48 She ultimately died there on the streets of Tehran, yet the images of her
death were caught on a cell phone video camera and uploaded to the Internet and would become the
galvanizing symbol of the movement. Unlike other deaths during the 2009 Green Movement, this
particular story is important as it represented a turning point in the momentum for the movement.
Once the images of Neda’s death were uploaded to Voice of America (VOA) servers and made their way to
YouTube sites around the world, people across the globe were instantly given an insight into the true
nature of the Iranian Government’s reaction to the protests. To both the Green Movement participants
and the international community, images illustrating Neda’s death depicted the severe steps the Islamic
regime would take in order to maintain control. Regardless of whether her death was the accidental shot
from a Basij Militia member’s gun, or if it was a targeted hit by government security officials, the final
effect was the same. That effect was the assumption that Iran’s leadership would stop at nothing,
including the killing of innocent people, to maintain power, as well as the velayat-e-faqih. In response to
this incident, supporting movements around the world from Paris, France, to Egyptian city streets sprang
up. The common theme throughout the world was the slogan, “I am Neda” that resonated the idea that
her death could happen to anyone and that her passion for freedom was meant for everyone else. 49 The
fact was that Neda was now the innocent face of the Green Movement enabling it to gain support from the
international community despite the Iranian Government’s best attempts to control the flow of
information concerning the realities of the protests. This event also represented the power of information
flow through the Internet medium and the effects this information could have on burgeoning movements
around the globe; a process that would be utilized later in the Arab Spring uprisings.
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“Neda Agha-Soltan,” New York Times, June 22, 2009, available at:
http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/people/s/neda_agha_soltan/index.html.
48 “Iran Doctor Tells of Neda's Death,” BBC News, June 25, 2009, available at:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8119713.stm.
49 Ulrike Putz, “Neda, is She Iran's Joan of Arc,” ABC News, June 22, 2009, available at:
http://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=7897043&page=1.
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